We investigate how product market competition affects the association between corporate governance quality and managers’ non-GAAP adjustments. Managers often disclosure in earnings announcements press releases non-GAAP earnings measures which are calculated by making adjustments to reported (GAAP) earnings. The lack of strict regulation in Europe and the voluntary nature of non-GAAP reporting gives European managers considerable discretion to make adjustments that are potentially misleading about firm performance. For the largest European firms and for fiscal years 2003-2007, we find that both strong corporate governance controls and high competition, when considered separately, are associated with smaller manager adjustments and adjustments for recurring items. However, when the two factors are considered concurrently governance controls have little effect in reducing aggressive non-GAAP adjustments whilst high competition is still associated with less aggressive adjustments. The findings suggest that in environments where product market competition is high there is less need for strong internal governance mechanisms in order to curb aggressive non-GAAP reporting

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non-GAAP, competition, corporate governance