Exportar Publicação

A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA)
Dias, C., Paiva, I. & Carvalho, Luísa Cagica (2024). Board member remuneration and earnings management: The case of Portugal. Administrative Sciences. 14 (1)
Exportar Referência (IEEE)
C. G. Dias et al.,  "Board member remuneration and earnings management: The case of Portugal", in Administrative Sciences, vol. 14, no. 1, 2024
Exportar BibTeX
@article{dias2024_1734885175108,
	author = "Dias, C. and Paiva, I. and Carvalho, Luísa Cagica",
	title = "Board member remuneration and earnings management: The case of Portugal",
	journal = "Administrative Sciences",
	year = "2024",
	volume = "14",
	number = "1",
	doi = "10.3390/admsci14010020",
	url = "https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3387/14/1/20"
}
Exportar RIS
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Board member remuneration and earnings management: The case of Portugal
T2  - Administrative Sciences
VL  - 14
IS  - 1
AU  - Dias, C.
AU  - Paiva, I.
AU  - Carvalho, Luísa Cagica
PY  - 2024
SN  - 2076-3387
DO  - 10.3390/admsci14010020
UR  - https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3387/14/1/20
AB  - This study draws on agency theory and evaluates the effect of the remuneration structures of board members on earnings management, proxied by discretionary accruals. To achieve the objective, this study uses a multiple regression model and a hand-collected dataset of Portuguese-listed firms from 2015 to 2019. This study suggests that fixed board remuneration is associated with lower levels of earnings management, as opposed to variable remuneration of board members, which is strongly associated with a higher level of earnings management. The findings based on this study provide useful information to investors and regulators in evaluating the effect of board compensation structure on earnings management. Additionally, this study expands the corporate governance literature by examining an under-researched mechanism to address the agency problem.
ER  -