Exportar Publicação

A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA) 
Greve, T. & Keiding, H. (N/A). Competing art auctions. Oxford Economic Papers. N/A
Exportar Referência (IEEE) 
T. Greve and H. Keiding,  "Competing art auctions", in Oxford Economic Papers, vol. N/A, N/A
Exportar BibTeX 
@article{greveN/A_1776743813989,
	author = "Greve, T. and Keiding, H.",
	title = "Competing art auctions",
	journal = "Oxford Economic Papers",
	year = "N/A",
	volume = "N/A",
	number = "",
	doi = "10.1093/oep/gpag010",
	url = "https://academic.oup.com/oep"
}
Exportar RIS 
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Competing art auctions
T2  - Oxford Economic Papers
VL  - N/A
AU  - Greve, T.
AU  - Keiding, H.
PY  - N/A
SN  - 0030-7653
DO  - 10.1093/oep/gpag010
UR  - https://academic.oup.com/oep
AB  - This paper examines the optimal choices of two competing auction houses, where each one is able to choose its own auction date so that the auctions run either simultaneously, sequentially, or with an overlap. We show that simultaneously running auctions, per se, is an optimal choice for each house. However, if we fix the supply of objects for sale, then the effects of this simultaneity disappear, and the houses choose arbitrary dates. If the sellers’ supply of objects to the auction house is taken into account, then overlapping auctions will be the equilibrium outcome and the optimising behaviour of the auction houses.
ER  -