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A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA) 
Carvalho, L. (2013). Perfect equilibria in replies in multiplayer bargaining. Journal of Applied Mathematics. 2013, ART248968
Exportar Referência (IEEE) 
L. C. Carvalho,  "Perfect equilibria in replies in multiplayer bargaining", in Journal of Applied Mathematics, vol. 2013, pp. ART248968, 2013
Exportar BibTeX 
@article{carvalho2013_1714753911463,
	author = "Carvalho, L.",
	title = "Perfect equilibria in replies in multiplayer bargaining",
	journal = "Journal of Applied Mathematics",
	year = "2013",
	volume = "2013",
	number = "",
	doi = "10.1155/2013/248968",
	pages = "ART248968",
	url = "http://www.hindawi.com/journals/jam/2013/248968/abs/"
}
Exportar RIS 
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Perfect equilibria in replies in multiplayer bargaining
T2  - Journal of Applied Mathematics
VL  - 2013
AU  - Carvalho, L.
PY  - 2013
SP  - ART248968
SN  - 1110-757X
DO  - 10.1155/2013/248968
UR  - http://www.hindawi.com/journals/jam/2013/248968/abs/
AB  - Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equilibrium outcomes. This
paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria strategies and analyse their weak robustness, namely the use of weakly dominated strategies. The paper then develops a renewed equilibrium concept, based on trembling hand perfection applied only on the replies, in order to overcome such weakness. Concluding that none of the classical equilibrium strategies survives the imposition of the extra robustness and, albeit using more complex strategies, the equilibrium outcomes don't change.
ER  -