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Coelho, M., Filipe, J. A. & Ferreira, M. A. M. (2014). AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT: “ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDIES” AND “PIN” PROCEDURES. Place?Based Policies and Economic Recovery-19.º Congresso da APDR Proceedings. 1, 1356-1365

M. Coelho et al.,  "AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT: “ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDIES” AND “PIN” PROCEDURES", in Place?Based Policies and Economic Recovery-19.º Congr.o da APDR Proc., Braga, vol. 1, pp. 1356-1365, 2014

@misc{coelho2014_1764937852845,
	author = "Coelho, M. and Filipe, J. A. and Ferreira, M. A. M.",
	title = "AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT: “ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDIES” AND “PIN” PROCEDURES",
	year = "2014",
	howpublished = "Ambos (impresso e digital)",
	url = ""
}

TY  - CPAPER
TI  - AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT: “ANTICOMMONS TRAGEDIES” AND “PIN” PROCEDURES
T2  - Place?Based Policies and Economic Recovery-19.º Congresso da APDR Proceedings
VL  - 1
AU  - Coelho, M.
AU  - Filipe, J. A.
AU  - Ferreira, M. A. M.
PY  - 2014
SP  - 1356-1365
CY  - Braga
AB  - Property rights are in the core of the problem of natural resources management. Last decades of the 20th
century have shown many problems arisen from the emergence of commons mismanagement and underdefined
property rights (The “Tragedy of the Commons”). In the 80s, Michelman introduced another
issue, this time about the excessive fragmentation of property rights. A new concept, “anticommons”,
was developed to put in evidence some problems one can see as the mirror image of traditional “Tragedy
of the commons”. Michelman introduced the concept of “anticommons” to explain “a type of property in
which everyone always has rights respecting the objects in the regime, and no one, consequently, is ever
privileged to use any of them except as particularly authorized by others”. In this sense, “anticommons” is
seen as a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource.
The problem stands in this: coexistence of multiple exclusion rights creates conditions for suboptimal use
of the common resource.
Buchanan and Yoon (2000) suggested a special view of this problem. The authors stated that the anticommons
construction offers an analytical tool for isolating a central feature of “sometimes disparate
institutional structures”. This means that the inefficiencies introduced by overlapping and intrusive
regulatory bureaucracies may be studied with the help of this conceptualization.
There are only a few empirical studies on anticommons tragedies in the real world, most of them focusing
on pharmaceutics industry. The main purpose of the paper is to use this conceptualization to study the
design and execution of aquaculture policy in Portugal and to introduce the possible emergence of an
“anti?commons tragedy” when we approach the difficult process of approval and execution of projects of
aquaculture in the Portuguese coastal areas. To study this problem, we use the results of the evaluation
process of the Operational Fisheries Program, funded by European Union and we introduce a new form of
simultaneous project evaluation in the so?called PINs (especially interesting Projects). Our results are
consistent with the suggestion of Buchanan and Yoon (2000).
ER  -