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Export Reference (APA) 
Madureira, Nuno Luis (2014). Waiting for the energy crisis: Europe and the United States on the eve of the first oil shock. Historical Social Research. 39 (4), 70-93
Export Reference (IEEE) 
N. L. Fernandes,  "Waiting for the energy crisis: Europe and the United States on the eve of the first oil shock", in Historical Social Research, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 70-93, 2014
Export BibTeX 
@article{fernandes2014_1765948572442,
	author = "Madureira, Nuno Luis",
	title = "Waiting for the energy crisis: Europe and the United States on the eve of the first oil shock",
	journal = "Historical Social Research",
	year = "2014",
	volume = "39",
	number = "4",
	doi = "10.12759/hsr.39.2014.4.70-93.",
	pages = "70-93",
	url = "http://www.gesis.org/en/hsr/current-issues/current-issues/394-energy-crises/"
}
Export RIS 
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Waiting for the energy crisis: Europe and the United States on the eve of the first oil shock
T2  - Historical Social Research
VL  - 39
IS  - 4
AU  - Madureira, Nuno Luis
PY  - 2014
SP  - 70-93
SN  - 0172-6404
DO  - 10.12759/hsr.39.2014.4.70-93.
UR  - http://www.gesis.org/en/hsr/current-issues/current-issues/394-energy-crises/
AB  - A global economic crisis is the most difficult kind of event to predict. This article asks a straightforward question: did anyone come close to anticipating the oil crisis of 1973/74, which represented a new type of historical sequence? Was the likelihood of an oil shock self-evident at the time? To answer this, I examine the degree of awareness in Europe and the United States of the three possible triggering factors: Egypt’s disposition to start a war and enlist the support of oil-producers; the Arab interest in oil conservation and long-term income maximization; and the imbalance in the oil market and the delayed adjustment of oil prices. For each of these topics, I set out both what was expected and what was actually in the offing; the information available to Western analysts and that unknown; the communication noises and the flagrant bias. The conclusion pays tribute to three men – James Akins, Pierre Wack, and Ted Newland – who had guessed what was coming ahead, and explains why their predictions almost succeeded, while others failed.
ER  -