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Moury, C. (2011). Italian coalitions and electoral promises: assessing the democratic performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II governments. Modern Italy. 16 (1), 35-50
C. B. Moury, "Italian coalitions and electoral promises: assessing the democratic performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II governments", in Modern Italy, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 35-50, 2011
@article{moury2011_1775843749845,
author = "Moury, C.",
title = "Italian coalitions and electoral promises: assessing the democratic performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II governments",
journal = "Modern Italy",
year = "2011",
volume = "16",
number = "1",
doi = "10.1080/09593969.2010.481090",
pages = "35-50",
url = "http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09593969.2010.481090"
}
TY - JOUR TI - Italian coalitions and electoral promises: assessing the democratic performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II governments T2 - Modern Italy VL - 16 IS - 1 AU - Moury, C. PY - 2011 SP - 35-50 SN - 1353-2944 DO - 10.1080/09593969.2010.481090 UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09593969.2010.481090 AB - Italian party coalitions (from both the centre-left and the centre-right) have enacted an average of 57% of the pledges included in their common manifestos. In relative terms, Italian political parties keep their electoral promises much less than parties governing in single-party government, but slightly outperform those that form post-electoral coalitions. Although this finding contradicts the widespread pessimism about Italy's performance, it also illustrates that there is no significant advantage to bipolarism and the existence of a common programme as opposed to situations where coalitions are formed after the elections. This might explain Italians' dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. ER -
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