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Export Reference (APA)
Gomes, O. (2015). A Budget Setting Problem. In Jean-Pierre Bourguignon, Rolf Jeltsch, Alberto Adrego Pinto, Marcelo Viana (Ed.), Dynamics, Games and Science – International Conference and Advanced School Planet Earth, DGS II. (pp. 305-315). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer International Publishing.
Export Reference (IEEE)
O. M. Gomes,  "A Budget Setting Problem", in Dynamics, Games and Science – Int. Conf. and Advanced School Planet Earth, DGS II, Jean-Pierre Bourguignon, Rolf Jeltsch, Alberto Adrego Pinto, Marcelo Viana, Ed., Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer International Publishing., 2015, pp. 305-315
Export BibTeX
@incollection{gomes2015_1715947451920,
	author = "Gomes, O.",
	title = "A Budget Setting Problem",
	booktitle = "Dynamics, Games and Science – International Conference and Advanced School Planet Earth, DGS II",
	year = "2015",
	volume = "",
	series = "",
	edition = "",
	pages = "305-305",
	publisher = "Springer International Publishing.",
	address = "Berlin, Heidelberg",
	url = "http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-16118-1_16"
}
Export RIS
TY  - CHAP
TI  - A Budget Setting Problem
T2  - Dynamics, Games and Science – International Conference and Advanced School Planet Earth, DGS II
AU  - Gomes, O.
PY  - 2015
SP  - 305-315
CY  - Berlin, Heidelberg
UR  - http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-16118-1_16
AB  - Consider a typical agency relation involving a capital owner and a manager.
The principal (i.e., the capital owner) has a potential budget to assign to investment
projects. The effective amount of investment will be a share of the potential level, given
the specific form of interaction that will be established between the principal and the agent
(i.e., the manager). The budget setting problem originating from this relation is evaluated
from the point of view of the manager, who wants to maximize the received budget, in an
intertemporal basis. The optimal control problem is subject to a constraint, which indicates
how the assigned budget evolves over time. In this constraint, a matching function takes
a central role; the arguments of the function are the agent’s effort to absorb new funds
and the financial resources the principal has available but has not yet channeled to the
manager.
ER  -