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A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA) 
Carmona, G. & Carvalho, L. (2016). Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 63, 131-138
Exportar Referência (IEEE) 
G. Carmona and L. C. Carvalho,  "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring", in Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 63, pp. 131-138, 2016
Exportar BibTeX 
@article{carmona2016_1714665183628,
	author = "Carmona, G. and Carvalho, L.",
	title = "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring",
	journal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics",
	year = "2016",
	volume = "63",
	number = "",
	doi = "10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.005",
	pages = "131-138",
	url = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406816000136"
}
Exportar RIS 
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
T2  - Journal of Mathematical Economics
VL  - 63
AU  - Carmona, G.
AU  - Carvalho, L.
PY  - 2016
SP  - 131-138
SN  - 0304-4068
DO  - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.005
UR  - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406816000136
AB  - We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games with private monitoring. We show that even when players have different and time-varying discount factors, each player’s payoff is equal to his stage-game minmax payoff in every sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that: (a) in every history on the equilibrium path, the pair formed by each player’s conjecture about his opponent’s action must be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and (b) the distribution of action profiles in every period is a correlated equilibrium of the stage game. In the particular case of public strategies in public monitoring games, players must play a Nash equilibrium after any public history.
ER  -