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A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA) 
Veiga, M. R. da & Major, M. (2019). Ethics in Transaction Cost Economics . In SESRR 2019 book of abstracts. (pp. 51-51).: DINÂMIA'CET - IUL.
Exportar Referência (IEEE) 
M. D. Veiga and M. J. Major,  "Ethics in Transaction Cost Economics ", in SESRR 2019 book of abstracts, DINÂMIA'CET - IUL, 2019, pp. 51-51
Exportar BibTeX 
@inproceedings{veiga2019_1732198517105,
	author = "Veiga, M. R. da and Major, M.",
	title = "Ethics in Transaction Cost Economics ",
	booktitle = "SESRR 2019 book of abstracts",
	year = "2019",
	editor = "",
	volume = "",
	number = "",
	series = "",
	pages = "51-51",
	publisher = "DINÂMIA'CET - IUL",
	address = "",
	organization = "",
	url = "http://hdl.handle.net/10071/18183"
}
Exportar RIS 
TY  - CPAPER
TI  - Ethics in Transaction Cost Economics 
T2  - SESRR 2019 book of abstracts
AU  - Veiga, M. R. da
AU  - Major, M.
PY  - 2019
SP  - 51-51
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10071/18183
AB  - This paper provides Aristotelian virtue ethics analysis of decisions regarding the UN internal
oversight governance structures focused on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory. We
explore “probity” and “independence” transactions’ attributes through historical narrative
case based research to answer to the question – Why consecutive decisions to strengthen
internal oversight structures did not relieve “probity” hazards? Our analysis shows that, at the
UN, increased oversight governance structures, i.e. incentives, did not relieve probity/ethics
hazards as predicted in TCE (Williamson, 1999). It follows that executive powers’ as well as
overseers’ systematically trumpeted the UN “rules of the game”, breaching probity/ethics,
disregarding the oversight independence prerogative as well as the UN Charter failing to
contribute to the “common good” and to protect the UN mission. It also follows that, as it
stands by now, the internal oversight mechanism design is deffective insofar as the UN
Charter, positions the Secretary-General in constant conflict of interest empowering he/she
with both executive and judiciary powers. We apply Williamson’s Public and Private
Bureaucracies TCE for the first time. It results that it should be modified to include “virtue
ethics” behavioral assumption as a transaction costs’ reduction device and explanatory
framework for ethical failures abandoning the opportunism behavioral assumption.
ER  -