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A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA)
Isidro, H. & Marques, A. (2019). Industry competition and signaling financial performance with non-gaap earnings. In American Accounting Association Annual Meeting 2019.
Exportar Referência (IEEE)
H. O. Isidro and A. Marques,  "Industry competition and signaling financial performance with non-gaap earnings", in American Accounting Association Annu. Meeting 2019, 2019
Exportar BibTeX
@inproceedings{isidro2019_1714708990422,
	author = "Isidro, H. and Marques, A.",
	title = "Industry competition and signaling financial performance with non-gaap earnings",
	booktitle = "American Accounting Association Annual Meeting 2019",
	year = "2019",
	editor = "",
	volume = "",
	number = "",
	series = "",
	publisher = "",
	address = "",
	organization = "",
	url = "https://aaahq.org/Meetings/2019/Annual-Meeting"
}
Exportar RIS
TY  - CPAPER
TI  - Industry competition and signaling financial performance with non-gaap earnings
T2  - American Accounting Association Annual Meeting 2019
AU  - Isidro, H.
AU  - Marques, A.
PY  - 2019
UR  - https://aaahq.org/Meetings/2019/Annual-Meeting
AB  - We explore how product market competition affects managers’ use of non-GAAP
earnings to signal financial performance. Using hand-collected data for large European
firms, we find that the non-GAAP earnings signal conveyed by managers (i.e. the
difference between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings) is higher when competition is
strong. Moreover, we show that in strong competitive environments firms with low
GAAP performance increase less their non-GAAP earnings signal than firms with high
GAAP performance. Low performing firms continue to experience below industry
performance in subsequent periods, thus the non-GAAP signal appear to be consistent
with their expected weak future performance. These findings are in line with a signaling
cost argument; industry competition can restrain aggressive non-GAAP reporting as false
signals about current and future earnings performance may induce the entrance of new
competitors or overproduction by existing ones, reducing the firm’s low income even
further.
ER  -