Exportar Publicação

A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA) 
Greve, T. (2020). Information Overload in a First-price Auction. New York University (NYU).
Exportar Referência (IEEE) 
T. Greve,  "Information Overload in a First-price Auction", in New York University (NYU), 2020
Exportar BibTeX 
@misc{greve2020_1735270490138,
	author = "Greve, T.",
	title = "Information Overload in a First-price Auction",
	year = "2020"
}
Exportar RIS 
TY  - CPAPER
TI  - Information Overload in a First-price Auction
T2  - New York University (NYU)
AU  - Greve, T.
PY  - 2020
AB  - This paper studies a first-price auction in a procurement setting, where each bidder
is requested to submit both a cost to be compensated for when delivering the project
and an amount of information about the project, obtained via a questionnaire. The
questionnaire can be of different levels of complexity. The bidders are interested in
shading their bids. However, they will also respond in accordance to the complexity
of the questionnaire. The more complex the questionnaire, the greater the effort the
bidders have to use to ensure consistency within the information to be delivered as
well as between the information and the proposed compensation. We show that the
introduction of complexity leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria and, under
suitable assumptions, to a unique equilibrium, where bidders submit truthful bids.
ER  -