Exportar Publicação

A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA) 
Donna, J. D. & Pereira, P. (2023). Rivals’ exit and vertical merger evaluation. Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 19 (2), 220-249
Exportar Referência (IEEE) 
J. D. Donna and J. P. Pereira,  "Rivals’ exit and vertical merger evaluation", in Journal of Competition Law and Economics, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 220-249, 2023
Exportar BibTeX 
@article{donna2023_1715190772602,
	author = "Donna, J. D. and Pereira, P.",
	title = "Rivals’ exit and vertical merger evaluation",
	journal = "Journal of Competition Law and Economics",
	year = "2023",
	volume = "19",
	number = "2",
	doi = "10.1093/joclec/nhad002",
	pages = "220-249",
	url = "https://academic.oup.com/jcle/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/joclec/nhad002/7048903?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=true"
}
Exportar RIS 
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Rivals’ exit and vertical merger evaluation
T2  - Journal of Competition Law and Economics
VL  - 19
IS  - 2
AU  - Donna, J. D.
AU  - Pereira, P.
PY  - 2023
SP  - 220-249
SN  - 1744-6414
DO  - 10.1093/joclec/nhad002
UR  - https://academic.oup.com/jcle/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/joclec/nhad002/7048903?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=true
AB  - We discuss a subset of vertical mergers, where the exercise of market power and the efficiencies enabled by a vertical merger reduce rivals' profits, making rivals' exit a potentially serious concern. Rivals' exit can fundamentally alter the welfare analysis of vertical mergers due to the reduction in product variety to consumers and the reduction in the number of competitors that would otherwise exert downward pricing pressure. An exit-inducing vertical merger might reduce welfare even if it is a welfare-enhancing merger absent exit. We present a theoretical framework to analyze vertical mergers that focuses on the possibility and consequences of exit, discuss the antitrust implications for merger evaluation, and provide examples. We argue that the possibility of rivals' exit should be an integral part of the analysis of vertical mergers.
ER  -