Scientific journal paper Q1
Investment and welfare implications of the ownership structure of overlapping networks
Duarte Brito (Brito, D.); Pedro Pereira (Pereira, P.);
Journal Title
Information Economics and Policy
Year (definitive publication)
2008
Language
English
Country
United States of America
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Abstract
We analyze the impact of the ownership structure of cable television firms on the incentives to upgrade the cable networks to offer telecommunication services. First, we show that dual ownership of a local telephone network and a cable network, compared with separate ownership, may increase or decrease incentives to invest in upgrading the cable television network. Coordination economies benefit dual ownership, and business-stealing benefits separate ownership. Second, we perform a welfare analysis of the investment decision and third, a welfare analysis of the ownership structure.
Acknowledgements
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Keywords
Cable networks,Local access,Competition
  • Economics and Business - Social Sciences