The term “popular justice” presents a paradox: all understand the concept, yet its perceived definition remains vague. The titles of two recent histories, Popular Justice: A History of American Criminal Justice (Walker 1998) and Popular Justice: A History of Lynching in America (Berg 2011), highlight the scope of the concept of popular justice. It includes at once the forms of normalized judicial powers and those that are under the control of the state (jury, elected magistrates, and non-professional judges). Equally, popular justice can be defined as a form of popular vindication and identified as an expression of uncontrolled violence—even as irrational. It refers as well to the legitimacy of local customs (charivaris, ducking) and social protests (émotions, rebellion). Distinguishing the limits of these definitions does not appear so clear-cut, however. German sociologist Max Weber defined popular justice as assimilation with the justice of the “cadis,” in reference to the Muslim judge reaching a verdict based on his own judgment, without it being tied to rules or to precedents; therefore, it reflects an irrational, subjective, and non-formalized law. Weber’s analysis illustrates that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the arbitrary powers formerly monopolized by the judge or by the prince were shared with the “popular classes.” In this chapter, I examine the dynamics that allowed popular justice to be placed at the center of a legal system, and its relationship with the evolution of European judicial thought. Far from being linear, I will illuminate the factors that favored or hindered its development....

--