Book chapter Q1
Vertical restraints and labor markets in franchised industries
Brian Callaci (Callaci, B.); Sérgio Pinto (Pinto, S.); Marshall Steinbaum (Steinbaum, M.); Matt Walsh (Walsh, M.);
Book Title
Big data applications in labor economics, Part B
Year (definitive publication)
2024
Language
English
Country
United Kingdom
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Abstract
This article combines 530 digitized Franchise Disclosure Documents and standard contracts with employer-identified job ads from Burning Glass Technologies to establish stylized facts about franchising labor markets and their relation to the vertical restraints and contractual provisions that limit the autonomy of franchisees vis a vis their franchisors. We report novel findings about the application of vertical restraints like Resale Price Maintenance, Exclusive Dealing, and No-poaching Restrictions, among many others, to a low wage workforce. A legal regime that favors the franchising business model incentivizes franchisees to profit at the expense of workers and to limit egalitarian tendencies operating in the workplace.
Acknowledgements
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Keywords
Vertical restraints,Franchising,Monopsony,Market power,Antitrust
  • Economics and Business - Social Sciences
  • Political Science - Social Sciences