Ciência-IUL
Publicações
Descrição Detalhada da Publicação
A Budget Setting Problem
Título Livro
Dynamics, Games and Science – International Conference and Advanced School Planet Earth, DGS II
Ano (publicação definitiva)
2015
Língua
Inglês
País
--
Mais Informação
Web of Science®
Scopus
Esta publicação não está indexada na Scopus
Google Scholar
Esta publicação não está indexada no Google Scholar
Abstract/Resumo
Consider a typical agency relation involving a capital owner and a manager.
The principal (i.e., the capital owner) has a potential budget to assign to investment
projects. The effective amount of investment will be a share of the potential level, given
the specific form of interaction that will be established between the principal and the agent
(i.e., the manager). The budget setting problem originating from this relation is evaluated
from the point of view of the manager, who wants to maximize the received budget, in an
intertemporal basis. The optimal control problem is subject to a constraint, which indicates
how the assigned budget evolves over time. In this constraint, a matching function takes
a central role; the arguments of the function are the agent’s effort to absorb new funds
and the financial resources the principal has available but has not yet channeled to the
manager.
Agradecimentos/Acknowledgements
--
Palavras-chave
Budget setting, Agency relation, Optimal control, Intertemporal optimization, Dynamic analysis.