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A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA) 
Greve, T. (2024). Competing Art Auctions. Penn State.
Exportar Referência (IEEE) 
T. Greve,  "Competing Art Auctions", in Penn State, Pennsylvania, 2024
Exportar BibTeX 
@misc{greve2024_1736858126204,
	author = "Greve, T.",
	title = "Competing Art Auctions",
	year = "2024",
	howpublished = "Outro"
}
Exportar RIS 
TY  - CPAPER
TI  - Competing Art Auctions
T2  - Penn State
AU  - Greve, T.
PY  - 2024
CY  - Pennsylvania
AB  - This paper examines the optimal choices of two competing auction houses,
where each one can choose its auction date, so that the auctions run either
simultaneously, sequentially or with an overlap. We use the art market as an
application. Under plausible outcome assumptions, we show that if the auctions
are running as a one-time-only event, then the optimal strategy of both is to run
simultaneous auctions. In the more realistic scenario, where auctions are running
as recurrent events, overlapping auctions turn out to be equilibrium choices. If
the process of supply of objects to the auction house is taken into account, then
overlapping auctions in the version of almost simultaneously running auctions
will be the equilibrium outcome of the optimizing behavior of the auction houses.
ER  -