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A publicação pode ser exportada nos seguintes formatos: referência da APA (American Psychological Association), referência do IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), BibTeX e RIS.

Exportar Referência (APA) 
Guillamon-Saorin, E., Isidro, H. & Marques, A. (2017). Impression management and non-GAAP disclosure in earnings announcements. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. 44 (3-4), 448-479
Exportar Referência (IEEE) 
E. G. Saorin et al.,  "Impression management and non-GAAP disclosure in earnings announcements", in Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 44, no. 3-4, pp. 448-479, 2017
Exportar BibTeX 
@article{saorin2017_1732209594518,
	author = "Guillamon-Saorin, E. and Isidro, H. and Marques, A.",
	title = "Impression management and non-GAAP disclosure in earnings announcements",
	journal = "Journal of Business Finance and Accounting",
	year = "2017",
	volume = "44",
	number = "3-4",
	doi = "10.1111/jbfa.12238",
	pages = "448-479",
	url = "http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jbfa.12238/full"
}
Exportar RIS 
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Impression management and non-GAAP disclosure in earnings announcements
T2  - Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
VL  - 44
IS  - 3-4
AU  - Guillamon-Saorin, E.
AU  - Isidro, H.
AU  - Marques, A.
PY  - 2017
SP  - 448-479
SN  - 0306-686X
DO  - 10.1111/jbfa.12238
UR  - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jbfa.12238/full
AB  - We study the market's reaction to the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures that are combined with high impression management. We construct an impression management score that captures several communication techniques that managers often use to positively bias investors’ perceptions of firm's performance. We hand-collect and code both quantitative and qualitative information from earnings announcement press releases of large European firms. Our results indicate that non-GAAP measures are informative to capital markets. However, non-GAAP adjustments are more persistent when accompanied by higher levels of impression management. This evidence is consistent with managers attempting to distort users’ perceptions when non-GAAP adjustments are of lower quality. Market reaction tests suggest that investors are able to see through managers’ intentions and discount non-GAAP information that is accompanied by high impression management. Moreover, investors in more sophisticated markets penalize non-GAAP measures communicated with high impression management. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including using a machine-coded tone measure
ER  -