Artigo em revista científica
Information Disclosure and Questionnaires in Public Tenders
Thomas Greve (Greve, T.); Hans Keiding (Keiding, H.);
Título Revista
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Ano (publicação definitiva)
2026
Língua
Inglês
País
Suécia
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Abstract/Resumo
Public tenders typically involve uncertainty and unforeseen costs, that might not be fully known to the bidders themselves. This uncertainty may also concern adaptation costs to the procurer after the delivery, and information about such adaptation costs may influence the bidding strategies, even though the cost is paid by the procurer. Consequently, the availability of information matters, and if it is obtained by the procurer, withholding information from bidders may be better than sharing all of it. To investigate the methods of gathering information, we consider pre-qualification stage questionnaires designed to obtain information from the bidders. If suitably designed, they can be used to disclose information of which the bidders are themselves unaware and can thereby serve as a tool for revealing the inherent tendency of the cost for the bidders, so that unforeseen future cost can be estimated.
Agradecimentos/Acknowledgements
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