Artigo em revista científica Q2
Italian coalitions and electoral promises: assessing the democratic performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II governments
Catherine Moury (Moury, C.);
Título Revista
Modern Italy
Ano (publicação definitiva)
2011
Língua
Inglês
País
Reino Unido
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Abstract/Resumo
Italian party coalitions (from both the centre-left and the centre-right) have enacted an average of 57% of the pledges included in their common manifestos. In relative terms, Italian political parties keep their electoral promises much less than parties governing in single-party government, but slightly outperform those that form post-electoral coalitions. Although this finding contradicts the widespread pessimism about Italy's performance, it also illustrates that there is no significant advantage to bipolarism and the existence of a common programme as opposed to situations where coalitions are formed after the elections. This might explain Italians' dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country.
Agradecimentos/Acknowledgements
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Palavras-chave
Coalition governance; Electoral pledges; Institutions; Italian political parties
  • Sociologia - Ciências Sociais
  • História e Arqueologia - Humanidades