Working Papers
Sketching a Model on Fisheries Enforcement and Compliance -- A Survey
Manuel Pacheco Coelho (Coelho, M. P.); José Filipe (Filipe, J.); Manuel Ferreira (Ferreira, M. A. M.);
Document Title
arXiv:2306.16960
Year (definitive publication)
2023
Language
English
Country
United States of America
More Information
Web of Science®

This publication is not indexed in Web of Science®

Scopus

This publication is not indexed in Scopus

Google Scholar

Times Cited: 0

(Last checked: 2024-05-19 08:54)

View record in Google Scholar

Abstract
Monitoring and enforcement considerations have been largely forgotten in the study of fishery management. This paper discusses this issue through a model formalization to show the impacts of costly, imperfect enforcement of law on the behavior of fishing firms and fisheries management. Theoretical analysis merges a standard bio-economic model of fisheries (Gordon-Schaefer) with Becker theory of Crime and Punishment.
Acknowledgements
--
Keywords
Fisheries,Crime,Punishment,Enforcement,Becker’s Theory
  • Mathematics - Natural Sciences
  • Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries - Agriculture Sciences
  • Economics and Business - Social Sciences

With the objective to increase the research activity directed towards the achievement of the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, the possibility of associating scientific publications with the Sustainable Development Goals is now available in Ciência-IUL. These are the Sustainable Development Goals identified by the author(s) for this publication. For more detailed information on the Sustainable Development Goals, click here.